We propose a novel mechanism for authentication of flooded queries in sensor networks. Each sensor can verify with certain probability that the query is sent by the base station. Implicit cooperation between sensor nodes during the flooding process ensures that the propagation of fake queries is limited to a small part of the network.
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks realize the vision of pervasive computing by bridging the gap between computer systems and the real world. They are deeply embedded into the physical surroundings and gather and process environmental data like temperature, humidity, light conditions, seismic activities. Some applications of sensor networks are precision agriculture, structural health monitoring (detecting damage in buildings, bridges, aircrafts), emergency and rescue operations, supply chain management.
Sensor networks consist of a large amount of small wireless computing devices, called sensor nodes, which measure and collect environmental data. Access to the data is organized via a gateway, called base station, which sends queries into the sensor network and gives the required data to the users. Sometimes the base station has to flood the sensor network with the query. An example of such a query is "which sensor nodes measure temperature above θ grad?".
As data gathered by the sensor network may be valuable or critical, they should be protected from the unauthorized access. We consider how the base station can authenticate its queries in case the queries are flooded, such that no illegitimate entity can send queries into the network.
We developed a probabilistic protocol for authenticated flooding which restricts propagation of fake queries to a logarithmical part of the network. Some sensor nodes in our protocol may fail to recognize a fake query. This does not matter much, however, as their number is very small.
Related Work
In SPINS [6] , authenticated streaming multicast μTESLA is realized using one-way hash chains, time synchronization, and symmetric keys shared by the base station with each sensor in the network. μTESLA realizes authenticated flooding very efficiently. Its security depends on the security of the underlying time synchronization mechanism. However, devising a protocol which globally synchronizes time in a large sensor network is a difficult task.
Relatively inexpensive digital signatures can also be used for authenticated flooding (see, e.g., [7] ), assuming that each sensor node is preloaded with the public key of the base station. These signatures, however, are still very expensive considering the limited resources of sensor nodes.
Our protocol uses only symmetric cryptography. It is based on the ingenious protocol by Canetti et al. [1] , but has a much better performance, as our protocol relies on the implicit cooperation between the sensor nodes which occurs during query flooding.
System Model
We consider a sensor network consisting of homogeneous sensor nodes which are similar to Telos sensor nodes [5] . There is also a base station in the network which is a laptop class device. The queries sent by a base station are called legitimate queries.
After receiving a query, each sensor node decides whether the query comes from the base station. If its decision is positive, we say that the sensor accepts the query. A sensor network satisfies Authenticated Query Flooding (AQF) if it satisfies the following properties:
• (Safety) If a sensor s in accepts the query q as a legitimate query, then q is a legitimate query, e.g., q was originated by the base station.
• (Liveness) Any legitimate query q will be received by all sensors in the network.
The adversary is an illegitimate entity interested in the data produced by the sensor network. The goal of the adversary is to post arbitrary queries to the sensor network, just like the base station can do. The queries sent by the adversary are called fake queries.
The adversary can capture some sensor nodes, in which case it knows their the cryptographic keys. Capturing means gaining information from a sensor node through direct physical access. As this requires non-negligible amount of time and resources, we assume that the adversary can capture only a small amount of sensor nodes, in order of tens, but certainly not of hundreds.
Authenticated Query Flooding Protocol
Our basic protocol for authenticated query flooding is called AQF-pass.
Preliminaries
We use ID-based key predistribution [9] , where each sensor node is preloaded with k pseudo-randomly chosen keys, called key ring, from the key pool of size l. The keys in the key pool are numbered from 1 to l. Each sensor s with a unique identifier id s is first assigned k distinct integers between 1 and l by applying a pseudo random number generator P RG() with the seed id s . Then the sensor s is preloaded with the keys whose identifiers are these k numbers from the sequence P RG(id s ). After that, any sensor can determine if it knows some keys from a set of key identifiers KID x characterized by the seed x. It computes P RG(x) = KID x and compares its own key identifiers to the key identifiers from KID x .
We also use 1-bit MACs, i. e., message authentication codes with 1-bit output. Similarly to [1] , we view an 1bit MAC under a given key as a random function, meaning that: (1) a single 1-bit MAC (under an unknown random key) cannot be feasibly guessed with any probability significantly exceeding 1 2 , and (2) m-bit string of m 1-bit MACs under m independent random keys cannot be guessed with probability significantly more than 1 2 m .
AQF-pass: Protocol Description
Base station The base station first computes the query q and a hash from the query x = h(q) using a hash function h(). Then it generates m key identifiers for the underlying ID-based key predistribution scheme: KID x = P RG(x) = (kid 1 , . . . , kid m ). We denote the corresponding key sequence K x = (k kid1 , ..., k kidm ).
Then the base station computes m 1-bit MACs on h(q) using keys from K x . We call these m 1-bit MACs authen-meaning of the variable variable number of nodes in the sensor network n number of keys in the key pool l number of keys in the key ring of a node k node density (average number of node's neighbors) d number of captured senor nodesñ number of captured keysb number of keys in the authenticator which the adversary knows Eb number of right bits in the fake authenticator B probability that the message will be forwarded Sensor nodes Upon receiving the query q with the authenticator macs(q), sensor s first computes x = h(q) and the sequence of key identifiers KID x = P RG(x). It compares the key identifiers from KID x to its own key identifiers in order to find out if s knows some keys from K x . If s knows some keys, it verifies the corresponding 1bit MACs from macs(q). If any of them does not verify correctly, then the sensor drops the query. If all verifiable MACs are correct, the sensor forwards the query to his neighbors according to the underlying flooding mechanism.
If the sensor is not able to verify any MACs (i.e., it does not know any keys from K x ), than the sensor forwards the query to his neighbors according to the underlying flooding mechanism. We say that the sensor passes the nonverifiable query. This action gives the name to the algorithm AQF-pass.
AQF-pass: Analysis
In the following, we analytically determine how many 1-bit MACs should be appended to queries in order to limit the propagation of a fake query to a logarithmically small part of the network. Variables used in the analysis are summarized in Table 1 .
Propagation Probability of a Fake Query
Assuming a secure hash function h(), it is infeasible to first choose some x and then search for an appropriate value q with h(q) = x. Therefore, we assume that the adversary Proceedings of the Fourth Annual IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops (PERCOMW'06) uses the following strategy: It computes the seed x = h(q) for its query q, computes the appropriate sequence of key identifiers KID x using P RG(x), and hopes that it knows enough keys with identifiers from KID x in order to be able to construct a fake query.
Ifñ sensor nodes are compromised, then the adversary knows on averageb keys:
Given that the adversary knowsb keys out of l, we can compute the average number of bits in a MAC of length m that will be correct due to the adversary's partial knowledge of the key space l:
Since the attacker knows nothing about the other keys in the authenticator, it has to guess the other bits. There it will have the probability of 50% to guess the correct value. This lets us compute the total number of correct bits in the faked authenticator:
We can finally compute the probability p f that a sensor accepts the query with the fake authenticator:
The first summand in the parentheses expresses the probability that the sensor node does not share any keys with the claimed set of key identifiers P RG(x). The second summand shows the probability that either the adversary could compute the appropriate bit or guessed it.
Limiting the Propagation of Fake Queries
To calculate the parameters that have to be set in order to stop a fake query from reaching a critical mass of nodes, we make use of the theory by Erdös and Rényi [2] which is also used in [3] : a random (n, p)-graph 1 becomes disconnected if pn < 1, i.e., if the average number of outgoing connections from a node is fewer than 1. In this case the largest connected component is of the size Θ(log(n)).
In our sensor network, each sensor has d neighbors on average, and each neighbor forwards the query with probability p f . Then, we have a (d, p f )-graph for query dissemination and therefore, we have to adjust the parameters that we can control, such that:
From Formulas 4 and 5 it follows:
The next task is to find suitable ranges for d, l, k and m, such that the adversary is unable to send fake queries for reasonable ranges ofñ. We did so analytically, as well as in a simulation.
Simulation Results
We simulated AQF-pass using Shawn [4] , a discrete event simulator for wireless sensor networks. We used key pool of l = 10, 000 keys and varied node density d ∈ {7, 15} and key ring size k ∈ {75, 150}. In each simulation run, 1000 nodes were randomly and uniformly placed such that the given node density d was satisfied. The source of the query (base station or the adversary) was also placed randomly. We looked into the number of nodes reached by an fake query for the authenticator size m = 50, 100, 150, . . . , 500 assuming that the adversary capturedñ = 0, 1, 2, 4, 16, 32, 64, 128 nodes. Due to space limit, we only present the most significant results here.
Firstly, we comment on the choice of the node density parameter. If the node density is too high, then the capacity of wireless networks decreases. Optimal node densities vary from 5 to 8. On the other hand, if the network density is too low, the network may become disconnected. Exact node density to ensure connectivity may be estimated as log n, but remains an open problem, see [8] . For our simulations we chose density 15, at which the network should certainly be connected, and density 7 which seems to be a border case.
For node density 15 and key ring size 75, the results of the simulations showed that the authenticator size should be more than the unacceptable 500 bits.
Formula 7 indicates that the size of the authenticator decreases with the decreasing node density and increasing key ring size. In Figure 1 
Discussion and Future Work

Strategies for propagation of non-verifiable queries
An obvious strategy is AQF-stop, where the node drops the query if it cannot verify it. However, it does not bring significant improvements. When the authenticator size is too small, legitimate queries do not propagate well. With the growth of the authenticator size, however, the event stop gets very rare. A more promising strategy is dropping the query with probability 1 2 h if the sensor could only verify h bits of the authenticator.
Flooding strategies The protocol AQF-pass works efficiently for sparse sensor networks. For denser networks, we plan to use more sophisticated flooding mechanisms, such as gossiping.
Preventing a sophisticated attack
If an attacker has no knowledge about a single bit in macs(q), it sends one message with the bit set, and one with the bit cleared. It can then guess from the number of nodes accepting the message, whether the bit should be set or not. This can be repeated for all unknown bits.
To thwart this attack, it has to be avoided that a query q can be sent with different macs(q). For example, each sensor could store the number of invalid requests it received from its neighbors. Further messages from a neighbor are only forwarded if the number of invalid queries from it is below a certain threshold.
Verification efficiency
We are now working on design of an efficient 1-bit MAC scheme, and plan to implement query verification on the real sensor nodes.
